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Response Essay: The Personhood Rationale and Its Impact on the 
Durability of Private Claims to Public Property 
 
ALEXANDRA B. KLASS* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In his insightful article, The Durability of Private Claims to Public Property, Professor Bruce 
Huber explores the nature of private claims to the use of federal lands as well as natural 
resources such as oil, gas, water, and coal located in or around those lands.1 The publication of 
Professor Huber’s article in April 2014 could not have been timed more perfectly to coincide 
with Cliven Bundy’s standoff that same month with Federal Bureau of Land Management 
(BLM) personnel over Bundy’s refusal to pay more than a million dollars of grazing fees 
incurred over decades of Bundy’s use of federal lands.2 The significant news coverage of the 
Bundy dispute placed a national spotlight on the tensions between long-term private uses of 
federal public lands and federal land managers that have always been prominent in the West but 
have received much less attention in the rest of the nation.  
This Response Essay proceeds in three Parts. First, it describes Huber’s concept of the 
“durability” of private claims to public property and draws parallels to the Bundy dispute. 
Second, it suggests that the personhood rationale behind the doctrine of adverse possession can 
help explain the durability of private claims to public property. This is true even though, as every 
student of first-year property law learns, neither the doctrine of adverse possession nor 
prescriptive easement generally applies to federal lands. Third, this Response Essay applies some 
of these principles to the Bundy dispute to provide additional insights into why the dispute so 
captured the public’s attention and generated such strong feelings on both sides of the debate. 
 
I.  THE DURABILITY OF PRIVATE CLAIMS TO PUBLIC PROPERTY 
 
One goal of Huber’s article is to describe how the legal and regulatory regimes governing the 
use of federal lands tend to protect existing use claims and to show how this framework makes it 
difficult for lawmakers and land managers to limit or extinguish existing private claims when 
federal land users, like Bundy, violate the terms of their permits or refuse to pay fees.3 Huber 
explores why, even when federal land managers are given significant statutory discretion to 
eliminate private uses or enforce limits on private uses of public lands, officials more often 
choose to avoid conflict and allow established permissive uses to continue even if they conflict 
                                                        
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. © 2014, Alexandra B. Klass. I received helpful comments 
on an earlier draft of this Essay from Robert Glicksman.  
1 See generally Bruce R. Huber, The Durability of Private Claims to Public Property, 102 GEO. L.J. 991 (2014). 
2 Jaime Fuller, Everything You Need to Know About the Long Fight Between Cliven Bundy and the Federal 
Government, WASH. POST (Apr. 15, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/04/15/ 
everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-long-fight-between-cliven-bundy-and-the-federal-government; Adam 
Nagourney, A Defiant Rancher Savors the Audience That Rallied to His Side, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/24/us/politics/rancher-proudly-breaks-the-law-becoming-a-hero-in-the-
west.html?_r=0. 
3 Huber, supra note 1, at 994. 
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with current federal land policies or environmental protection values.4 As examples, Huber uses 
livestock grazing permits, permits to build ski resorts, permits for hydropower facilities, oil and 
gas leasing, coal leasing, and continued personal occupancy on land assembled for national parks 
or monuments.5 Huber describes, in the context of grazing permits, that even though the federal 
government expressly states in the permit that the grazing rights are subject to reduction or 
termination if drought or other conditions warrant, commercial banks routinely lend against the 
value of the permit because of the government’s historical reluctance to limit or terminate such 
land uses.6 
Huber states that a partial explanation for the durability of these private claims to public 
lands is historical.7 Until the early 1900s, Congress’s main objective with regard to public lands 
was to encourage settlement and resource extraction.8 It accomplished these goals through 
various federal policies to facilitate land and resource development.9 Although in the early 
twentieth century Congress created new policies to create national forests, parks, and 
monuments, and to better conserve federal lands and resources, it continued to allow access to 
such lands and resources, and that policy continues today.  
Certainly, there have always been calls, particularly today on the right, for the government to 
relinquish many of its claims to public lands and to transfer those lands to states and private 
parties. As Huber points out, though, many individuals and corporations with present-day claims 
to public lands are quite content with the current system of private access to public lands.10 So 
long as limits on private access are not enforced, private users of public lands receive the 
benefits of grazing, resource extraction, or other land uses at low cost without any of the burdens 
of land ownership.11 Such private users do not pay taxes on the land, need not restore the land in 
case of drought or natural disaster, often have priority rights as compared to later potential users 
of adjacent public lands or resources, and may face less liability for the environmental impacts of 
their activities than if they were the fee simple owners.12  
Private users of public lands can rely on their claims being “durable” in Huber’s words 
because of “the awkward fit between the task of public land management and the political 
institutions charged with doing so.”13 Huber describes how difficult and costly it is for the 
federal government to monitor its vast amounts of land, particularly with no neighbors to help 
enforce violations, as would occur in a situation where a private landowner is surrounded by 
other landowners with a common interest in protecting their own private interests in the 
neighborhood.14 Land managers understandably wish to avoid confrontation and violence with 
private users of public lands, and so they often let violations slide.15 
                                                        
4 Id. at 995. 
5 Id. at 994–95. 
6 Id. at 1005. 
7 Id. at 996. 
8 Id. at 996–97. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 1033. 
11 Id.  
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 1034. 
14 Id.  
15 Id. at 1034 n.237. 
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Thus, as noted above, many private users of public lands and resources actually prefer federal 
ownership of public lands, rather than the transfer of those lands into private or state control, 
because the private users receive benefits from the lands without the corresponding burdens. But 
Huber is quick to point out that  
 
all of these benefits could only be realized if they rested atop a foundation of a durable 
legal claim to a publicly owned resource. Crucial commercial constituencies, we may be 
quite sure, would not have supported federal land control nearly as quickly without 
assurances of the long-term security of their claims, in both law and administration.16  
 
What happens when that “security” of private claims is challenged, and the federal 
government decides to exercise its explicit right to allow a grazing permit or other permit to 
expire? Not surprisingly, the holder of the private right resists. Huber uses the example of the 
recent litigation over oyster farming in the Point Reyes National Seashore in California.17 When 
the land for the seashore was being assembled in the 1970s, Congress allowed an oyster farm to 
continue operating for forty additional years, at which time the permit would expire, and the 
seashore would be eligible for wilderness designation.18 But eight years before the anticipated 
2012 expiration of the permit, the oyster farm was sold to a new owner with full knowledge of 
the termination of the permit.19 The new owner lobbied hard to extend the permit and engaged in 
years of litigation when the Interior Secretary refused to extend it.20 Clearly, the owner assumed 
the Interior Secretary would allow the farm to continue and took action when the durability of 
that claim was, contrary to the norm, not upheld in that particular case.  
Just as the oyster farmer in the Point Reyes case defended his right to continue his private 
claims to public lands, Cliven Bundy and his supporters went beyond litigation and created a 
major physical standoff with federal officials to preserve Bundy’s claims to public lands. 
Throughout the standoff, Bundy and his followers continually emphasized that he and his family 
had grazed the land in question for over one hundred years.21 In the oyster farming case as well, 
the duration of the permit was, at least in the background, an equitable reason why it was unfair 
for the federal government to eliminate the use after so long—even though the government 
always had retained the right to do so. There is also, particularly in the Bundy case, an implicit 
argument that in these situations the private users of public lands are more connected to the land 
than the federal government (or at least the federal land managers who come and go over the 
years). Thus, it may be that such users of federal land perceive their long-term connection with 
the land as the basis for the durability of their claims—so durable as to override any legal limits 
that may be contained in the permits themselves. 
Many teachers and students of property law will recognize in this argument some of the 
policy reasons behind the doctrine of adverse possession. Thus, the next Part summarizes the 
personhood rationale behind the adverse possession doctrine and explains why, despite the 
federal public lands exception, the personhood rationale still provides insights into both Huber’s                                                         
16 Id. at 1037–38. 
17 Id. at 1035. 
18 Id.  
19 Id. 
20 Id.  
21 See, e.g., Fuller, supra note 2; Nagourney, supra note 2. 
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concept of the durability of private claims to public lands and the application of that idea to the 
Bundy case. 
 
II.  THE ROLE OF ADVERSE POSSESSION 
 
Adverse possession is a legal doctrine, dating back to at least sixteenth-century England and 
adopted in the United States, that legally transfers property from the original or “true” owner to a 
possessor or user of the land (the adverse possessor) if the possession is (1) actual and exclusive; 
(2) open and notorious; (3) adverse or hostile under claim of right; and (4) continuous for the 
statutory period.22 Every state has the doctrine in one form or another and has at least one statute 
of limitations that sets the period beyond which the true owner of the land can no longer bring an 
action for trespass against the adverse possessor.23 If the elements of adverse possession are met, 
the adverse possessor becomes the legal owner of the property and can seek legal recognition of 
that fact in court.24 Prescriptive easements differ from adverse possession with regard to the type 
of interest acquired. Adverse possession is based on exclusive possession of the property and 
results in transfer of title to the property, whereas a prescriptive easement is based on a 
continuous and adverse use of the property and results in transfer of an easement to continue to 
use the property.25 
In the case of federal lands, there are several legal impediments to an adverse possession or 
prescriptive easement claim. The first and most important, of course, is that adverse possession 
does not apply to federal lands at all.26 Federal statute prohibits adverse possession of 
government lands except in very limited circumstances.27 Even beyond that prohibition, in the 
context of private claims to public lands, the use of land is with permission of the federal 
government and thus is not adverse or hostile under claim of right.                                                          
22 See, e.g., POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 91.02 (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2009); Alexandra B. Klass, Adverse 
Possession and Conservation: Expanding Traditional Notions of Use and Possession, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 283, 286 
(2006). 
23 Klass, supra note 22, at 286–87; see also JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 116–22 (7th ed. 2010). 
24 See Klass, supra note 22, at 287 n.14. 
25 DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 23, at 124 n.15. 
26 See United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 40 (1947) (“The Government, which holds its interests here as 
elsewhere in trust for all the people, is not to be deprived of those interests by the ordinary court rules designed 
particularly for private disputes over individually owned pieces of property; and officers who have no authority at all 
to dispose of Government property cannot by their conduct cause the Government to lose its valuable rights by their 
acquiescence, laches, or failure to act.”); DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 23, at 150 (stating that under the common 
law, adverse possession does not run against the government but that some states have modified that rule by statute 
to allow adverse possession against some or all state lands). 
27 See 48 U.S.C. § 1489 (2012) (prohibiting adverse possession or prescription of federal lands and allowing title to 
pass only by conveyance); Paula R. Latovick, Adverse Possession Against the States: The Hornbooks Have It 
Wrong, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 939, 939 n.2, 940 (1996) (noting that under some states’ laws, adverse possession 
is allowed to run against some state lands but that adverse possession does not apply to federal lands except for 
limited statutory exceptions). Two federal statutes, Conveyances of Occupants of Unpatented Mining Claims and 
the Lands Held Under Color of Title Act permit the Secretary of the Interior to convey up to a certain acreage of 
land to a claimant who establishes he or she has held the tract for certain purposes for a certain period of time and 
has placed improvements on the land. See Latovick, supra, at 939 n.2; see also 3 OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. 
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-978SP, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW 13-256 to 13-258 
(3d ed. 2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/210/203470.pdf (describing law prohibiting adverse 
possession against federal government for federal lands except in limited circumstances allowed by statute). 
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So, one might ask, why even talk about adverse possession or prescriptive easements in the 
context of federal lands? In my view, it is relevant because one of the primary policy reasons 
behind the doctrine of adverse possession, the personhood rationale, may help explain the 
durability of private claims to public property. 
In general, scholars and courts point to three policy rationales to support the doctrine of 
adverse possession: (1) the “limitations” rationale, based on the notion that once a true owner is 
given actual or constructive notice of a claim on his or her land, there is an obligation to bring a 
timely legal action to assert legal rights to the property to avoid stale claims and old evidence; 
(2) the “administrative” rationale, which views adverse possession as a means of curing minor 
title defects and protecting the title of the possessor, which was important in the early days of the 
nation when there were many errors in land records; and (3) the “personhood” rationale, which 
recognizes that after a certain period of time, the person in possession of the land forms a 
personal attachment to it that is much stronger than that of the true owner who has presumably 
become detached from the land—or else he or she would have brought a legal action to assert his 
or her rights.28 
It is the third, personhood rationale that is most relevant for present purposes. The 
personhood justification was first and most famously described by Oliver Wendell Holmes, who 
stated:  
 
I should suggest that the foundation of the acquisition of rights by lapse of time is to be 
looked for in the position of the person who gains them, not in that of the loser. Sir Henry 
Maine has made it fashionable to connect the archaic notion of property with 
prescription. But the connection is further back than the first recorded history. It is in the 
nature of man’s mind. A thing which you have enjoyed and used as your own for a long 
time, whether property or an opinion, takes root in your being and cannot be torn away 
without your resenting the act and trying to defend yourself, however you came by it.29  
 
Since then, many scholars have pointed to this justification for adverse possession or 
prescriptive easement as a primary explanation for why the law essentially allows “title by 
theft.”30 For instance, Joseph Singer states that the adverse possessor 
 
comes to expect and may have come to rely on the fact that the true owner will not 
interfere with the possessor’s use of the property. If the adverse possessor were to be 
ousted from the property, she would experience a loss. The adverse possessor’s interests 
grow stronger over time as she develops legitimate expectations that the true owner will 
continue to allow her to control the property.31                                                         
28 See Klass, supra note 22, at 288–90. These rationales are also phrased slightly differently as the “sleeping” theory, 
the “stability” theory, and the “earning” theory of adverse possession. The earning theory differs from the 
personhood theory in that under the earning theory, an adverse possessor builds a claim to the land because he or she 
has made productive use of the land in a way that benefits society. Under the personhood theory, productive use is 
not necessarily required. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 23, at 120–21 (discussing sleeping and earning theories 
of adverse possession); CHRISTOPHER SERKIN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 56–57 (2013) (same). 
29 O. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 477 (1897). 
30 See Jeffry M. Netter et al., An Economic Analysis of Adverse Possession Statutes, 6 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 217, 
217 (1986). 
31 Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 666–67 (1988) (footnote 
omitted); see also Margaret Jane Radin, Time, Possession, and Alienation, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 739, 739–42 (1986)  
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Likewise, Thomas Merrill, in explaining the various bases for adverse possession, describes 
the personhood rationale in terms of the reliance interest that the adverse possessor develops 
through the longstanding possession of property. This description in many ways describes both 
Huber’s theory of durability of private claims to public property as well as the Bundy 
showdown: 
 
The [reliance] justification appears in several different forms. One form, having distinct 
echoes of a frontier society, invokes the interest in “preserving the peace.” After a 
sufficient period of time has elapsed, so the argument goes, the [adverse possessor’s] 
attachment to the property will be so strong that any attempt by the [true owner] to 
reassert dominion may lead to violence. In another form, the reliance argument draws 
upon the personality theory of property rights, and posits that the [adverse possessor] may 
have developed an attachment to the property which is critical to his personal identity.32 
 
Notably, the personhood or reliance rationale focuses primarily on the actions and interests of 
the adverse possessor. This stands in contrast to the other justifications for adverse possession, 
which tend to emphasize the failures of the true owner to assert his or her claims to the property. 
This difference is significant in the context of continued private claims to public lands. It means 
that even if there is a legal rule that prevents adverse possession or acquisition of a prescriptive 
easement of such lands, the long-term user of the land may well develop the same attachment to 
the land as would be the case if the land was privately owned. Indeed, the attachment to public 
lands may in some cases be even more pronounced because of the lack of other neighboring 
private landowners and a succession of changing federal land managers over a series of decades. 
This may in many cases make the private claimant seem, at least to him or herself, more 
permanently attached to the land than the true owner, who necessarily is embodied only in the 
form of a constantly changing federal land manager. 
Why then, in light of the personhood rationale, should we not apply the doctrine of adverse 
possession to government lands? As a pure legal matter, as noted above, the law prohibits 
adverse possession of virtually all federal public lands. But is there a good reason for the law to 
trump the personhood rationale underlying adverse possession that property theorists describe?   
In a roundtable discussion in 1986 at the Washington University Law School, property 
scholars discussed this issue.33 The scholars raised the point that if the law allowed adverse 
possession against the government, it might make the government think twice before taking large 
parcels of land out of productive use and would also reinforce the strong personhood and 
utilitarian arguments in favor of adverse possession.34 Others responded, however, that there 
were several utilitarian reasons for treating government lands differently. These reasons include 
the expense associated with adequately monitoring the land to avoid adverse possession claims 
which would fall to taxpayers, rewarding concentrated interests (the adverse possessor), and                                                                                                                                                                                   
(describing various rationales for adverse possession and noting that “the claim to an owned object grows stronger 
as, over time, the holder becomes bound up with the object”). 
32 Thomas W. Merrill, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1122, 1131 
(1985) (footnote omitted); see also Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession, 89 GEO. L.J. 
2419, 2473 (2001) (analyzing various justifications for adverse possession and concluding that the only rationale 
that provides any justification for application of the doctrine in modern times is the personhood model). 
33 Time, Property Rights, and the Common Law: Round Table Discussion, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 793 (1986). 
34 Id. at 831–32. 
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penalizing the diffuse interests of taxpayers who may enjoy the land in public hands.35 Beyond 
these arguments, if a majority of the public believes there are benefits to the federal government 
retaining and preserving large amounts of lands for national parks, open space, and management 
of natural resources, then it makes sense not to require the same sort of management and use on 
the part of the federal government that we would require of private owners with respect to these 
lands. 
But even if we accept that there are good reasons to exclude federal lands from the adverse 
possession doctrine, it still may be impossible to prevent private claimants from attaching 
themselves to federal public land if such claims are allowed to continue for decades or even a 
century. Although the purpose of this Response Essay is not to resolve the issue, the next Part 
looks more closely at the Bundy dispute and considers how some of the facts and arguments 
made in this dispute fall within the personhood approach to adverse possession as well as 
Huber’s description of the durability of private claims to public property. 
 
III.  THE PERSONHOOD RATIONALE AND ITS ROLE IN THE DURABILITY OF PRIVATE CLAIMS FOR 
PUBLIC LANDS 
 
The above discussion reveals that even if we have a pure legal rule that prevents adverse 
possession of government lands, the personhood rationale helps explain why users of public 
lands may create durable claims to that land and why members of the public may support those 
claims. The durability of claims based on personal attachment to land, described through history 
by property theorists back to Oliver Wendell Holmes,36 may also help explain why the federal 
government is wary of eliminating or limiting private claims to public lands—to avoid conflict—
even if it has a clear right to do so. This means, however, that when the federal government does 
decide to assert its rights, private claimants like the oyster farmer in California or Cliven Bundy 
in Nevada resort to litigation, mass protest, or violence. Whether legally valid or not, from the 
perspective of the private user, it may make little difference that the government clearly limited 
private rights to use the land in the underlying oyster farming permit, grazing permit, or other 
legal document. Under the personhood theory, the attachment forms through the private 
claimants’ actions rather than the government’s actions or inactions. 
According to news reports, Bundy and his ancestors have grazed the land in question in 
Nevada, near the Utah border, since his family homesteaded the ranch in the 1870s.37 Beginning 
in 1993, the BLM limited grazing on approximately six hundred thousand acres of federal land in 
Nevada adjacent to the Bundy ranch to protect the endangered desert tortoise.38 Bundy refused to 
abide by these restrictions, and ultimately the BLM revoked his grazing rights. As a result of that 
revocation, and Bundy’s refusal to stop grazing his cattle on the land in question, he has now 
incurred over $1 million in unpaid grazing fees since 1993.39 After numerous lawsuits, all of 
which Bundy lost, the BLM attempted to begin moving five hundred of Bundy’s cattle in 2014,                                                         
35 Id. at 832–34. 
36 See Holmes, supra note 29. 
37 See, e.g., Fuller, supra note 2; Nagourney, supra note 2. 
38 Fuller, supra note 2; Nevada Officials Blast Feds Over Treatment of Cattle Rancher Cliven Bundy, FOX NEWS 
(Apr. 10, 2014) [hereinafter Nevada Officials Blast Feds], http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/04/07/nevada-
officials-blast-feds-over-treatment-cattle-rancher-cliven-bundy. 
39 Fuller, supra note 2; Nagourney, supra note 2. 
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over twenty years after the unauthorized grazing began.40 This led to physical confrontations, 
threats of violence, and large rallies in support of the Bundy family.41 It also led to around-the-
clock national news coverage for several weeks in April 2014, particularly by Fox News, as 
many national conservative and libertarian politicians rallied around Bundy and criticized federal 
management of public lands.42 Indeed, the dispute has once again raised long-standing tensions 
regarding the federal government’s ownership of over eighty percent of the land in Nevada and 
over fifty percent in several other western states, as compared with only four percent of lands in 
the rest of the United States.43 For those who favor the transfer of such lands to the states and to 
private parties, the Bundy dispute has provided a platform to make statements about government 
heavy-handedness and to question why the government would put the interests of desert tortoises 
over local ranchers.44 
In the Bundy dispute, many commentators and members of the public have described Bundy 
as simply a “freeloader” who has obtained years of private benefit in free grazing rights from 
public lands that belong to all of us.45 But many supporters of Bundy (and there remain many, 
even after the disclosure of his controversial views on slavery, race, and various other social 
issues) defend his claims.46 Notably, there has been significant focus in virtually all the Bundy 
news coverage on the fact that he and his ancestors have grazed the land in question for over one 
hundred years. One nearby resident quoted in The New York Times stated: “Someone like the 
Bundys, they have been here for generations, before the B.L.M. was ever created, using this land 
to graze their animals. And the B.L.M. comes in and changes the rule. A small little rancher 
trying to make a living and they come in like big bullies.”47  
Of course, many would point out that grazing fees are far below market value, resulting in 
inappropriate taxpayer support of ranchers like Bundy even when they pay the grazing fees in 
question.48 Nevertheless, both Senator Dean Heller of Nevada and Governor Brian Sandoval 
condemned the BLM for “heavy-handed actions” involving Bundy and other Nevada residents 
using federal lands.49 According to a guest commentary in Forbes magazine, the government 
was unreasonable in demanding that Bundy not graze his lands in the springtime to protect the 
tortoise habitat when Bundy’s family had homesteaded the land more than a century ago and had 
paid grazing fees until the dispute began in 1993.50 The commentary went on to state that “[t]he                                                         
40 Fuller, supra note 2; Nagourney, supra note 2. 
41 Id. 
42 E.g., Nevada Officials Blast Feds, supra note 38; see also Fuller, supra note 2; Nagourney, supra note 2. 
43 See Jim Carlton, Grazing Limits Feed Tension in Nevada, WALL ST. J. (May 27, 2014, 7:04 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/articles/grazing-limits-feed-tension-in-nevada-1401231844. 
44 For discussions of the long history of opposition to federal government retention and management of large tracts 
of federal lands in western states, particularly Nevada, see CHRISTINE A. KLEIN ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 
38–41, 50–53 (3d ed. 2013); Robert L. Glicksman, Fear and Loathing on the Federal Lands, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 
647 (1997); Carlton, supra note 43; Fuller, supra note 2. 
45 See, e.g., Vickery Eckhoff, Federal Grazing Program in Bundy Dispute Rips-Off Taxpayers, Wild Horses, 
FORBES (Apr. 25, 2014, 12:55 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/vickeryeckhoff/2014/04/25/federal-grazing-
program-in-bundy-dispute-rips-off-taxpayers-wild-horses. 
46 Geoffrey Lawrence, Cliven Bundy Is a Racist, but Federal Ownership of State Land Is Still a Serious Problem, 
FORBES (Apr. 30, 2014, 10:37 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/04/30/cliven-bundy-is-a-racist-but-
federal-ownership-of-state-land-is-still-a-serious-problem. 
47 Nagourney, supra note 2.  
48 See Eckhoff, supra note 45. 
49 Nevada Officials Blast Feds, supra note 38. 
50 Lawrence, supra note 46. 
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federal government, in short, chose to privilege the [desert] tortoise over the long-established 
livelihood of Bundy and his family.”51 As Bundy told reporters from Range magazine in 1999, 
“Every time we tried some compromise—they wanted more. It was like talking to a greedy 
landlord.”52 
A detailed timeline of events published in The Washington Post in April 2014 chronicles the 
decades-long fight between the federal government and Bundy over the use of the federal lands 
in question.53 The timeline, as well as the other news coverage, illustrates perfectly the durability 
of private claims to public lands that Huber has described. In this case, the federal government 
did not attempt to physically remove the cattle until more than twenty years of unauthorized 
grazing had elapsed and Bundy had refused to comply with multiple court orders to remove the 
cattle. Indeed, the government delay itself may have further cemented the durability of Bundy’s 
claim by making the government’s actions seem so extreme when it might not have been if 
undertaken more quickly and, more importantly, by a private party rather than the federal 
government. 
The references in the news coverage to the federal government as a “landlord,” even though 
Bundy’s legal rights to the land are far less than a tenant’s, and the characterizations of federal 
land managers as “heavy-handed,” are telling. Just as important, the dispute is not really about 
grazing fees, which Bundy paid for decades, but over the federal government’s decision to limit 
grazing in the springtime for species-protection purposes in 1993. Once the government decided 
to place limits on Bundy’s use of the land in a significant way, the government was asserting its 
rights as a property owner and not just as a bank receiving grazing fees. The government 
assertion, for the first time, of its right to limit grazing on the property directly interfered with 
perceived rights upon which Bundy and his neighbors had come to rely over time, regardless of 
whether that reliance was at all justified. Thus, it was the use conflicts between two parties both 





Even when the legal rules governing adverse possession or easement by prescription do not 
apply, the rationales behind these doctrines may remain. This is particularly true in the case of 
federal lands, which are exempted from adverse possession or easements by prescription but 
remain subject to widespread use by private parties. There are multiple explanations for the 
durability of private claims to public property, many of which Huber explains so well in his 
article. But the personhood rationale is, perhaps, another explanation for the durability 
phenomenon, and the Bundy dispute is only the most recent high-profile example. 
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